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Abstract 
For many years, electronic communications has been one of the most important areas of policy 
intervention for the European Union. Liberalisation and privatisation of the telecommunications 
industry were very important topics of the policy debate in the two decades from 1990 to 2010. In 
these years, the EU developed a sophisticated regulatory framework aspiring to the principle of 
favouring the entrance of new players in the sector and characterised by a strong pro-competition 
flavour. More recently, however, the necessity of mobilising important investments for the creation of 
new Next Generation Networks, capable of delivering all the benefits of the digital revolution to 
European citizens, has cast doubts on the validity of the established framework. This paper discusses 
the solutions adopted during the liberalisation process and summarizes some of the key future 
challenges to the existing regulatory framework.  
Keywords 
Telecommunications policy, European telecommunications policy, regulation, European regulation, 
Internet, Over-The-Top (OTT), New Generation Access Networks (NGAN), European single market, 
broadband, European Digital Agenda, Data Protection, liberalisation, harmonisation. 
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 1 
Introduction 
In this paper, we provide an overview on the interventions and the main issues faced by European 
telecommunications policy after the liberalisation of the markets. In particular, we will analyse 
problems connected to four main areas of policy intervention: the fixed telephony market; the mobile 
telephony market; the Internet; and the Single European Market goal and the appropriate institutional 
approach to regulation.  
For each area of intervention, we examine the issues that led to the creation and the consolidation 
of the present regulatory framework. In particular, a demand to liberalise the sector from former state 
monopolies, which was at the heart of the creation of a pro-competitive/pro-entrance approach in 
Europe, seems to be the main driver of the current regulatory framework. Then, we look at the 
situation as it is nowadays. Today, we are faced with a set of new issues that will affect the future of 
the European telecommunications markets. The main question is that of how to create the right 
conditions to spread the economic and social advancements promised by the digital revolution, for 
example the conditions needed to encourage investments in Next Generation Networks
1
.  
After two decades and more European market regulation, some new fundamental questions need to 
be answered by the European Union and by national regulators to respond to the natural evolution of 
how the industry and technology have developed so far. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lists old and new problems in the evolution of the 
fixed lines markets after liberalisation. Section 2 examines the mobile industry, its rapid evolution and 
the present necessity for more band and better spectrum management. Section 3 analyses the role of 
the Internet and of its native companies in relation, and in conflict, with traditional services and 
operators in electronic communications. Section 4 deals with the long-term demand for the creation of 
a European Single Market, also in relation to the evolution of sector regulation and the need for 
supranational coordination. A brief conclusion follows. 
1. Fixed lines: from service competition to infrastructure competition to NGNs 
The starting point of European telecommunications policy was the concomitance of the necessity of 
liberalising and privatising the State monopolies, in order to unleash the potential of competition and 
to improve efficiency (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006), in parallel with the objective of creating and 
sustaining the growth of a common internal market for electronic communications.  
The start of the modern phase of European telecommunications policy can be seen with the 
publication of the Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications 
Services and Equipment (COM(87)290), whose purpose was to liberalise the markets in 
telecommunications terminal equipment and provide for the abolition of special or exclusive rights to 
import, market, connect, bring into service and maintain telecommunications terminal equipment. This 
was the first step towards the liberalisation of all the telecommunications markets, which culminated 
in the ‘90s with two important interventions: the Open Network Provision and the Full Competition 
Directive.  
In 1990, the so-called Open Network Provision (Directive 90/387/EC) determined the liberalisation 
of voice telephony and infrastructures, with the aim of creating the conditions to allow other operators 
                                                     
1
 According to the definition given by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Next Generation Networks 
(NGN) are packet-based networks able to provide Telecommunication Services to users and able to make use of multiple 
broadband and QoS-enabled transport technologies, and in which service-related functions are independent of the 
underlying transport-related technologies.  
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to gain access to national telecommunications networks on fair and non-discriminatory terms, and 
thereby to compete with the established incumbents while sharing their infrastructure where 
indispensable. The Directive set the rules for open access to the networks of the old monopolies so that 
the new entrants could offer services in competition – on equal terms – with the ex-monopolies. This 
objective of opening the sector to competition led to the introduction of asymmetric regulation: ex-
monopolies, or incumbent operators, were imposed with obligations that new entrants did not face.  
The Open Network Provision laid the basis for the Interconnection Directive (97/33/EC), which 
provided detailed conditions to ensure an open and efficient interconnection of networks as an 
instrument to foster competition, both in regard to access and to final services to customers. The 
Interconnection Directive stated that interconnection charges should follow the principles of 
transparency and cost orientation, implying, amongst other things, the publication of a reference offer 
and the obligation to keep separate accounts for wholesale and retail operations for all vertically 
integrated operators.  
In parallel, the introduction of the competition directive (Directive 90/388/EC) and the amending 
act, called the Full Competition Directive (Directive 96/19/EC), required Member States to cease to 
grant special or exclusive rights to national telecommunications operators, as this practice constituted 
an improper restriction on trade in the internal market. Certain services, exempted from the previous 
Directive 90/388/EC in recognition of the problems posed by deregulation and the additional time 
required to find solutions, were finally liberalised. In fact, the main feature of the Full Competition 
Directive was to require Member States to liberalise voice telephony, to bring to completion the 
liberalisation process of telecommunications services in Europe.  
The European access regulation included, progressively, an obligation to offer an interconnection 
to incumbents’ networks at cost-oriented prices and a duty to allow access to essential components of 
the network, especially, as key access regulatory instruments. Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) and 
bitstream
2
 came into the picture with the EC Regulation on Local Loop Unbundling (EC/2887/2000), 
which came into force on 2 January 2001, while an obligation for the incumbent to offer bitstream to 
entrants when it is already available to its own services, is contained in Directive EC/10/98. These 
rules were, and still are, the milestone for the creation of sustainable competition based on new 
services, but also on (partially) new infrastructures, in the European telecommunications arena. 
The whole set of provisions regarding the telecommunications sector before the fundamental 2002 
reform is sometimes referred to as the 1998 package, because in 1998 the obligation was imposed on 
governments to liberalise entry into all their telecommunications markets. The main objective of this 
set of interventions was to conclude the early stage of market liberalisation of the telecommunications 
sector through the implementation of an asymmetric regulation, which defined the rights of new 
entrants, imposed restrictions on the historical operators in order to open their network face 
infrastructure, and defined Universal Service Obligations (USO) in the interest of consumers (Cave 
and Prosperetti, 2001).  
Indeed, the decision to eliminate State monopolies and to sustain the birth and growth of a new 
liberalised competitive harmonised telecommunications market in Europe introduced the necessity of 
finding a balance between static and dynamic efficiency. At the beginning of this process, immediately 
after the liberalisation of the markets, it was necessary to create the conditions for reaching a workable 
level of competition, concentrating the regulatory rules on the limitation of market power and the 
creation of a level playing field between old and new competitors on the same telecommunications 
                                                     
2
 Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) is the process where the incumbent makes its local network (the copper cables that run 
from customers’ premises to the telephone exchange) available to other companies. Bitstream access refers to the 
situation where an incumbent installs technology and a modem in the customer's premises and then makes the access link 
available to third parties, to enable them to provide broadband services to customers. With bitstream access, the 
incumbent provides the ADSL technology and modems, while entrants do not have control over the physical line and nor 
are they allowed to add other equipment. 
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platform. This necessity was due to the fact that there was only one network, owned by the incumbent 
operator, and it was fundamental to concentrate ex-ante regulation on achieving service competition 
downstream, impeding abusive practices by the incumbent.  
The goal of maximising static efficiency, however, generally comes into conflict with the need to 
also reach dynamic efficiency: a high level of competition lowers the operators’ profits and therefore 
their incentive to invest. The objective of the European regulatory intervention, however, was to create 
competition so that entrants could earn enough expertise, market share and profits to be able to invest 
in their own network and eventually reach a situation in which infrastructure competition would 
become a reality and the most invasive rules could be phased out, particularly regarding mandatory 
access to elements of the incumbent’s network. This idea of using services-based competition as a 
stepping-stone to infrastructure-based competition has been theorised under the name of “Ladder Of 
Investment” (LOI) theory (Cave and Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006).  
In 2002, the European telecommunications regulatory framework was completely revisited to take 
into account the need for a more flexible technology-neutral regulatory setting, required by the rise of 
the Internet and the convergence between services once offered on different technological platforms. 
The new regulatory package
3
 fully promoted the so-called LOI approach by putting an accent on the 
formulation and implementation of access policy, not only to challenge the endurance of competitive 
bottlenecks, but also to foster a gradual move towards infrastructure-based competition. The reform 
was heavily based on the use of competition policy tools, such as the relevant market definition and 
the subsequent Significant Market Power (SMP) concept, essentially corresponding to the dominant 
position in competition law
4
. However, more importantly, all the principles inspiring the reform were 
competition based: the idea behind the whole regulatory design was to lay down the terms under 
which ex-ante regulation would be needed only until a more sustainable kind of competition took 
place in the telecommunications market, and therefore only ex-post antitrust regulation would be 
sufficient. 
A wide theoretical and empirical academic debate on the success of the 2002 framework, and in 
particular on the LOI theory, has not yet given a definitive answer to whether the theory actually 
works in the real world as a way to accompany and foster investments by entrants (Cambini and Jiang, 
2009; Bourreau et al., 2010). Robust empirical evidence is difficult to obtain due to a lack of data at 
micro-level (local exchange level), so aggregate data on investment (Grajek and Roller, 2011) or 
proxies (Waverman et al., 2007) have been used. A recent study by Bacache et al. (2013) using micro-
data finds the interesting result that the LOI hypothesis works in the case of entrants who climb the 
ladder from bitstream access to LLU, but not from LLU to building their own fibre networks. 
Bouckaert et al. (2010) find that inter-platform competition is the only main driver to spur investment 
in broadband networks. In a recent paper, Nardotto et al. (2012) show empirically that there are no 
strong positive effects of local loop unbundling entry on broadband penetration levels, which could 
suggest that the positive competitive effects are outweighed by the adverse effects of reduced 
incentives to invest. However, it turns out that, while local loop unbundling entry has not raised total 
broadband penetration across different local markets, it has substantially increased the quality of the 
service as measured by average broadband speed (Nardotto et al, 2012). 
In reality, European telecommunications markets are witnessing a rather slow deployment of 
investment in NGN, which could be due to the current period of demand uncertainty and financial 
                                                     
3
 The new regulatory package consisted of the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC), the Access Directive (2002/19/EC), the 
Authorisation Directive (2002/20/EC), the Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC), the Radio Spectrum Decision 
(676/2002/EC), the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (2002/58/EC) and the Regulation on 
Unbundling of the Local Loop (2887/2000/EC). 
4
 For further explanation of the relevant market and the SMP concept in telecommunications regulation, see the 2002 
“Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services”. 
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crisis, but may also partially depend on the regulatory setting in force (Digital Agenda Scoreboard, 
2013). In this circumstance, co-investment plans between different industry operators can constitute a 
solution, even if they may create new competitive bottlenecks, depending on the co-investment 
agreement conditions (Cambini and Silvestri, 2013; Cambini and Silvestri, 2012). Antitrust scrutiny of 
such agreements, and also regulation of the access conditions to the new network, may become 
essential tools to guarantee open network development in the market, particularly with respect to the 
access conditions for outsiders to the agreement. Various possible compensation mechanisms for 
insiders to the agreement, exchange of information, and other related problems are now under 
theoretical and practical scrutiny (Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011; BEREC, 2012).  
Another crucial variable in this process is constituted by the access conditions to the legacy copper 
network, which may or may not favour investment and/or transition to the NGN (Bourreau, Cambini 
and Hoernig, 2012; Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan, 2012; Inderst and Peitz, 2012; Cave, 2010). The 
copper network, in fact, constitutes an imperfect substitute for the NGN, entailing a replacement effect 
for incumbent and alternative operators. Revenues made on copper constitute an opportunity cost of 
using the NGN rather than the copper network.  
The European Commission is trying to set new rules for the NGN according to a more flexible 
approach, trying to ensure incentives to invest and overall competition, while also considering the 
importance of regulation of the copper network during the transition. A recent document by the 
European Commission contains a Recommendation on non-discrimination and costing methodologies 
for the regulation of NGN. The objectives of this document, as also acknowledged by the Body of 
European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) in the comments to the 
Recommendation, are: to provide for pricing flexibility of NGN services; to ensure effective non-
discrimination and sufficient competitive constraints; to guarantee predictable and stable regulated 
wholesale copper access prices which are also consistent with the principle of cost-orientation; and to 
ensure a level playing field between incumbent and alternative operators through the implementation 
of effective and proportionate non-discrimination obligations which facilitate downstream 
competition.  
The Recommendation applies the principle of the Equivalence of Inputs
5
 to guarantee non-
discrimination between incumbent and alternative operators. Regarding the possibility of a price 
squeeze, the Recommendation says that the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) can decide whether 
to use an Equally Efficient Operator or a Reasonably Efficient Operator standard
6
, to ensure that the 
offers made by the incumbent operator are technically replicable by alternative operators. 
The transition between the copper network and NGN is at present the frontier of the new 
equilibrium through which the European Commission is trying to revive the LOI theory in an 
environment in which investment in new future-proof networks is the key challenge to regulators. The 
NGA Recommendation (2010/572/EU) acknowledges the need to take into account the fact that the 
transition from copper-based to fibre-based networks may change the competitive conditions in 
different geographic areas. Consequently, geographically differentiated remedies should be applied 
where appropriate. 
A general question can be asked as to whether countries with a lighter regulatory burden have 
performed better in terms of investment, market growth and competition. The US, for example, has 
                                                     
5
 Equivalence of Inputs is a concept requiring that the incumbent provides the entrant with the same conditions related to 
inputs which it offers to its own retail division, also regarding, for example, timescales, terms and conditions (including 
price and service levels) for the retail offer. 
6
 The Equally Efficient Operator standard states that to be considered replicable, the retail offer made by the incumbent has 
to be compared with the offer made by an equally efficient entrant. The Reasonably Efficient Operator standard states 
that the comparison is made with an entrant which is not necessarily as efficient as the incumbent (which benefits from 
experience and scale), but with an entrant which is slightly less efficient. 
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turned to a more market-based rather than interventionist approach in telecommunications regulation. 
In fact, policy intervention is mostly ex-post. In the US, investment in broadband has a solid and 
growing base, with strong private capital expenditure, but both in the mobile market and in the fixed 
market, the level of competition is lower, with two leading operators covering almost all of the market. 
In Europe, instead, there are numerous telecommunications operators, offering more diversified 
services and choices, but they also appear less keen or able to invest in new networks. European 
telecommunications operators suffer, with respect to their US counterparts, from working on a smaller 
scale, which also puts them in a disadvantageous position against Internet-native worldwide operators 
when competing with the same services. Traditional European telecommunications operators, also 
through the European Telecommunications Network Operators (ETNO) association, are asking the 
commission and NRAs to loosen the regulatory burden and to let the market proceed towards a path of 
consolidation. According to their view, a pan-European market could only become possible if 
traditional network operators were allowed to increase their size and overcome the current state of 
fragmentation, which is a handicap to the growth and the competitiveness of the European 
telecommunications market. 
In synthesis, while a detailed judgment of the LOI strategy is still under analysis by theorists, there 
is no doubt that bringing in competition, through access and interconnection regulation on the legacy 
networks at the national level has been a European success. The new problem is how to replicate this 
success with NGN networks, but before this, how to contribute to the deployment of NGN networks in 
Member States.  
2. Mobile lines: problems of the new competitive environment and the future of 
spectrum management 
Initially, the mobile markets were not considered to be markets subject to the same competitive issues, 
such as competitive bottlenecks, as the fixed telephony market, characterised by the presence of one 
legacy network to be considered an “essential facility”7. Mobile markets immediately presented an 
opportunity for a more symmetric structure, which did not required a regulatory intervention as 
intrusive as that needed to create competition in the fixed telephony markets after decades of 
monopoly.  
Nonetheless, a serious regulatory problem with important implications for competition emerged 
almost immediately: a crucial element in the telecommunications markets is constituted by the 
interconnection between customers using different operators. At the start of the industry, mobile 
operators set mobile interconnection rates through negotiation and commercial agreements, with the 
regulator only intervening when parties failed to agree
8
 .  
In Europe, from the start, the interconnection charge has been based on the Calling Party Network 
Pays (CPNP) system, in which the originating operator pays a per-minute charge to the operator that 
terminates (i.e. receives) the traffic being exchanged. At the same time, users are charged under the 
Calling Party Pays (CPP) system, where the person who makes the call pays for the entire cost of that 
call but pays nothing for any call received. Under this regime, interconnection charges tend to be quite 
high and to be reflected in the final charges to the users. In the process of termination, in fact, a 
request to speak to a certain customer poses the operator who terminates the call in a sort of 
monopolistic position, being the only network that can satisfy the request to conclude the call. 
                                                     
7
 The “essential facility” concept is related to the characteristics of an infrastructure when it is deemed to have a specific 
purpose and is highly costly to replicate, therefore the use of such an infrastructure is essential to offering a certain 
service. 
8
 Interconnection charges are the payments made by operators to compensate each other for the traffic exchanged between 
their networks. 
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Therefore, a competitive bottleneck is generated. The high charges resulting from this system are 
considered by regulators and economists the inefficient result of such competitive bottlenecks.  
An alternative to the European retail charging mechanism is the Receiving Party Pays (RPP) 
system used in the US, where the person receiving a call pays all or most of the cost. In the mobile 
sector, this refers to payment of an “airtime charge” or premium for the actual termination on the 
recipient’s handset, while the originator might still pay a lower fee which is due for the fixed line 
segment of the call. This retail charging arrangement usually coexists with a Receiving Party Network 
Pays (RPNP) system, where an operator receiving a call pays a charge to the originating operator. 
Thanks to this mechanism, the reception charges are kept quite low, without need for regulatory 
intervention. The reason is that the retail price reflects the call termination cost. Therefore, operators 
tend to keep the latter low with a RPNP system. Sometimes operators decide to eliminate the call 
termination charges completely, adopting a Bill and Keep (BAK) system (Marcus, 2004). The RPP 
mechanism is not applied in Europe because it was considered costly and disruptive for operators, 
given resistance from customers to paying for calls received, the risk of lower penetration rates and, 
ultimately, the risk of people turning off their mobile phones. On the other hand, however, an RPNP 
system does not require termination rate regulation and tends to generate more minutes of 
conversations per call.  
The new European regulatory framework of 2002 (Directive 2002/21/EC) required regulators to 
review interconnection rules in order to reach a more harmonised framework and to better monitor the 
level of interconnection charges. As a result, many European countries introduced price controls for 
mobile interconnection charges, most commonly on mobile termination and sometimes also on mobile 
origination. Nonetheless, the level of interconnection charges in Europe remained very high and 
undoubtedly well above industrial costs in most member States throughout the decade. Furthermore, 
as a matter of fact, the high level of fixed-to-mobile termination charges created a self-perpetuating 
situation in which fixed telephony customers were financing the growth of the mobile market and 
operators by paying over-high tariffs.  
In May 2009, the European Commission reacted to a situation that was judged very unsatisfactory 
by adopting a Recommendation on the regulatory treatment of fixed and mobile termination rates 
throughout the European Union (Recommendation 2009/396/EC). The Recommendation was designed 
to remove cross-subsidies between fixed and mobile services, leading to a reduction in fixed-to-mobile 
retail tariffs, higher fixed-to-mobile call volumes and the inclusion of fixed-to-mobile calls in flat rate 
call packages (TERA Consultants for the EC, 2009). In the end, the final objective was to achieve a 
decrease in the final tariffs to consumers, considering the high level of termination charges to be a fruit 
of a market distortion that should be corrected. BEREC, the institutional body coordinating National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), supported the European Commission’s initiative by affirming that the 
2009 Recommendation would be sufficient in the short-medium term to bring a positive benefit to 
consumers essentially through the “level” effect of lower termination rates.  
The Recommendation set out strict principles for national regulatory authorities to follow when 
setting fixed or mobile termination rates. The main aim of this intervention was to improve the CPNP 
system so that the termination charge would reflect as much as possible the efficient economic cost. 
The long-run incremental cost (LRIC) model was recommended as the methodology that NRAs 
should use to ensure termination rates were based on the costs incurred by an efficient operator.  
The European Commission considered that high termination charges had two main effects, both 
highly undesirable: they distorted competition between fixed-line and mobile operators and services 
and constituted a barrier to entry and expansion for new players in the mobile market, especially when 
combined with significant on-net/off-net call price differentials. In fact, the possibility of exploiting 
high termination rates for off-net calls was creating a specific problem for competition in the mobile 
industry: it would favour the largest operators, allowing them to price discriminate against new 
entrants and smaller operators by attracting customers through low, or even zero, prices for on-net 
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calls within their large networks financed by the high termination rates for off-net calls. When off-net 
calls are more expensive, customers tend to prefer a larger network, a phenomenon dubbed “tariff 
mediated externality” by economists (Armstrong and Wright, 2009). 
In an effort to contrast the regulatory evolution pursued by the Recommendation, several mobile 
operators sponsored various studies tending to show that lowering mobile termination rates would not 
necessarily reduce prices for consumers, because other tariffs – such as subscription charges – would 
be likely to increase. In fact, a theoretical effect, called the “waterbed effect”, was discovered. The 
reasoning behind the effect was that, given the competitive bottleneck that generates from having 
exclusive access to the user who is being called, each potential mobile customer comes with a 
“termination rent”, which leads mobile operators to compete for these customers by offering them 
attractive deals. If regulation cuts these termination rents, then mobile operators may compete much 
less aggressively for mobile customers and the retail tariff paid by customers would unavoidably tend 
to rise (Genakos and Valletti, 2011).  
However, in recent times, the repeated complaints from many mobile operators about a fall in 
profit caused by the reduction in termination rates induced by the widespread application of the 2009 
Recommendation on rate reduction by NRAs tend to confirm that, in reality, the “waterbed effect” was 
not particularly relevant and termination rate reduction ultimately reached the final customers.  
As a last point about the termination debate, it is interesting to recall that moving to a BAK regime 
would completely bypass the bottleneck monopoly and the associated distortions of conventional CPP 
regimes, yet enable operators and customers to choose between CPP and RPP (Littlechild, 2006). 
There have been several studies at European level trying to assess the benefit of switching to a BAK 
system instead of to an “improved” CPNP system (TERA Consultants for the EC, 2009). One of the 
important reasons for a change in the charging method, aside from eliminating the monopoly 
bottleneck in termination and the related cost of regulation, is that it would set the same 
interconnection charging method across different technologies. Creating a common technology-neutral 
charging principle may become a very important target for policy with the convergence of services 
such as voice, video, Internet, and data traffic in general, and with the advent of NGN. Indeed, the IP-
based network charging scheme has been a BAK system from the start, unregulated and subject to a 
net-neutrality obligation. BEREC has acknowledged the potential long-term importance of positive 
“system” effects which the introduction of BAK could bring, but it considers that the frictions in the 
switch would be difficult to control, so in the short-medium term each Member State can stick to the 
“improved” CPNP (BEREC, 2010). 
Nowadays, the most important issue for the future of the mobile sector appears to be the crucial 
demand for spectrum availability in the face of a surge in spectrum use essentially due to mobile data 
transmission. The spectrum is a finite and unique resource, which can be used both for commercial 
services, like information and communications services, and for the supply of traditional public 
services, like education, health and public safety. Spectrum can also help in bridging the digital divide 
for areas not reached by broadband connections, since mobile penetration and mobile connectivity can 
be a powerful driver of broadband diffusion. In some Member States, mobile penetration is much 
higher than fixed telephony penetration, for example in Romania. For all these reasons, an optimised 
use of the spectrum can generate great societal benefits and an increase in European competitiveness 
in the global arena.  
The ways to gain the greatest benefits from the spectrum are not straightforward though, as there 
are several potential modes of assigning and managing the rights of use – geographically, time-wise, 
and frequency-wise. In a first phase, the European policy regarding the use of the spectrum was 
directed at creating a coordinated pan-European introduction of selected uses of the band, e.g. 
Directive 87/332/EEC for GSM communications and Directive 91/287/EEC for cordless technology. 
At that time, the main issue to address was the technical coordination of the use of the spectrum in the 
different Member States.  
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The first move towards a European policy for spectrum harmonisation is constituted by the Green 
Paper on Spectrum Policy (596/1998/COM). This Green Paper aimed at initiating a public debate on 
how to approach the creation of a European-level spectrum policy programme, which started to be 
recognised as a crucial goal for the competitiveness and the economic role of the EU in the global 
market. A framework for Radio Spectrum Policy in the EU was then included in the 2002 regulatory 
framework for electronic communications
9
, particularly through the Radio Spectrum Decision 
(676/2002/EC).  
The Radio Spectrum Decision established the policy and regulatory tools to support the 
coordination of national policy approaches for the availability and efficient use of radio spectrum. This 
decision somehow institutionalised spectrum policy in Europe, establishing the Radio Spectrum 
Committee, with the task of helping the Commission in overcoming technical hurdles, and the Radio 
Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG), with the function of issuing opinions or producing reports on specific 
and strategic radio spectrum policy issues. A constant effort towards harmonisation has characterised 
European spectrum policy in the subsequent years, as proven by the numerous decisions with 
harmonisation as their main object
10
.  
In the last few years, the rapid increase in mobile electronic means of communications such as 
smartphones, tablets, and other connected devices such as video games consoles, has determined an 
impressive growth in data traffic, which doubled in 2012, with mobile data traffic alone estimated to 
have increased by 69% (Digital Scoreboard, 2013). Consumers tend to demand more and more 
ubiquitous Internet access and wireless technologies to substitute or complement fixed broadband 
access.  
Besides ubiquitous service, consumers also expect quality of service, which again is a more 
demanding task with the type and variety of services being used over the Internet. This tendency 
triggers demand for more capacity, which is raising the spectre of a risk of spectrum crunch in Europe. 
It seems clear, however, that the problem is not the scarcity of the spectrum per se, but its misuse or 
underuse, which leads to a severe under-exploitation of the available spectrum in Europe. Concerning 
these issues, the US situation is probably as rigid and complex as the European one.  
The traditional approach to spectrum in Europe was based on assigning the right to use a certain 
band of the spectrum for a specific purpose. However, this strategy cannot follow the changes needed 
with the rapid developments in technology and the convergence of telecommunications. This 
difficulty, often mentioned by operators, has a strong regulatory underpinning. Fragmentation of the 
rights to use the radio spectrum, due to local assignation procedures and different national regulatory 
frameworks is a serious limit to an efficient use of the resource.  
The challenge now is not only to prepare the ground for new releases of spectrum, which will 
enlarge the overall availability of bands, but also to try to change the regulatory setting in the direction 
of the most flexible and optimised use of the existing already-assigned bands. Indeed, there are several 
ways to escape a spectrum crunch: reallocating the spectrum, via releases of more spectrum, mergers 
among mobile operators or reallocation of existing rights to the spectrum; changing the spectrum 
market mechanisms, which means the rules for auctions, the creation and the working of secondary 
markets and the pricing mechanisms; trying to control traffic growth, via a better network architecture; 
and adopting new technologies, like cognitive radio.  
In 2012, the European Parliament and Council issued a document which points in several of these 
directions, the Radio Spectrum Policy Programme (Decision 243/2012/EU). This Decision is 
motivated by several important objectives: to create a common and consistent framework for spectrum 
management across Europe, to eventually reach a digital single market in the EU; to promote the 
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principles of efficient use and effective management of spectrum, as well as technological and service 
neutrality, to achieve more flexibility in the use of the spectrum; and to ensure optimal re-farming of 
released bands to those interested in the digital dividend.  
In a subsequent document “Promoting the shared use of radio spectrum resources in the internal 
market” (COM(2012) 478 final), the Commission invited administrators and firms to identify 
Beneficial Sharing Opportunities (BSO) in given bands. BSO are described in the Collective Use of 
Spectrum (CUS) model – which provides all users with shared or "collective" usage rights to access a 
particular band and an interference solution mechanism – in the Licensed Sharing Access (LSA) 
model – in which different users need a licence to have access to a shared band. The Commission 
suggests a procedure driven by the demand from new spectrum users, BSO applicants, to enable a 
process based on CUS or LSA. However, the Radio Spectrum Policy Group seems to point to LSA as 
a better sharing method insofar as it guarantees a higher quality of service and more coordination 
between incumbents and new users. LSA appears to have certain advantages over CUS: it can be 
implemented rapidly in Europe under the existing EU regulatory framework for electronic 
communications; it aims at offering a predictable quality of service, well-defined rights of use and 
obligations; and it can foster a progressively increased harmonisation of frequencies for mobile 
internet access and use (Parcu et al., 2012). 
In synthesis, the traditional bottlenecks that induced high termination rates and high costs for 
customers and inappropriate cross-subsidies between fixed and mobile networks appear to be 
essentially overcome. In the mobile sector, the focus is now primarily on the necessity to respond to a 
surging demand for video and data transmission on mobile networks, a demand that requires a much 
more efficient, innovative and harmonised use of spectrum in Member States.  
3. Internet native companies and the clash with traditional operators of electronic 
communications markets 
The ‘90s in electronic communications were primarily the years of the Internet. They witnessed an 
explosive growth in different electronic markets and the rise of so-called e-commerce. A much-cited 
1999 article in The Economist stated: “The explosive growth of the Internet promises a new age of 
perfectly competitive markets. With perfect information about prices and products at their fingertips, 
consumers can quickly and easily find the best deals. In this brave new world, retailers’ profit margins 
will be competed away, as they are all forced to price at cost....”. 
The fundamental function of a marketplace is to facilitate demand and supply matching, by letting 
the information flow more smoothly between buyers and sellers. In this respect, early research on 
electronic marketplaces highlighted the multiple advantages that both buyers and sellers could obtain 
by making transactions on online platforms (Bakos 1997, 2001).  
In sum, low consumer search costs, the absence of spatial product differentiation, and the 
possibility of switching supplier at potentially zero cost altogether should promote competitive 
pricing. In addition, the efficiency of consumer searching can greatly benefit from the use of search 
intermediaries, i.e. search engines that find and compare all the commercial conditions on products 
(prices, delivery time, availability, shipping costs, etc.). Low set-up costs for websites and 
distributional systems promote low concentration. Thus, compared to traditional retailing, Internet 
retailing seems to present the characteristics of a more efficient almost frictionless market.  
Empirical and theoretical analyses, however, proved soon enough that these suppositions did not 
turn out to be completely or even partially right. Even in nearly perfect markets, price dispersion still 
exists due to consumer preferences both on price and non-price attributes of goods and services, such 
as reputation (Brynjolfsson et al., 2009). These results are also confirmed in studies finding evidence 
of both extraordinarily strong price competition and also of obfuscation strategies on behalf of retailers 
on intermediary websites (Ellison and Ellison, 2009). Obfuscation strategies can be adopted by online 
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retailers to increase search costs to buyers, and consequently decrease competitive pressure. Therefore, 
the Internet certainly brought more efficiency but did not remove all frictions from the markets 
involved in e-commerce. 
For many sectors, however, mainly media and editorial markets like newspapers, magazines, the 
music industry, and also for the advertising sector, the spread of the Internet imposed a radical change 
of business model. In the media and music industry, the chance to get digital versions of products 
online means directly tackling the traditional business model based on the physical selling of the good. 
These sectors were impacted by a truly radical change and suffered a dramatic decrease in profits 
during the process. In the advertising market, the Internet started playing a key role thanks to the 
availability of a huge amount of new and high quality data on Internet users’ preferences and 
characteristics, which allowed advertising messages to be much better tailored than with other 
traditional media, and, therefore, increased the attractiveness of advertising online, at least for the most 
Internet-oriented part of the population.  
Business on the Internet started developing in a powerful and disruptive manner, changing the way 
many businesses had worked for decades and diffusing new ways of searching for goods and selling 
them to customers. Today, it is clear that the Internet is not only a new technology which may have a 
specific effect on how business is conducted in certain sectors, but it is also a market place per se, as 
the enormous success of over-the-top (OTT) firms demonstrates.
11
 
In particular, it is not breaking news that it is possible to offer certain services, such as voice 
telephony and instant messaging, using the Internet instead of the traditional telecommunications 
networks. In these recent years, the rapid spread of smartphones, tablets and other connected devices 
has dramatically increased the use of over-the-top services by customers. This phenomenon has 
determined a decline in revenues from voice and text messaging for telecommunications companies, 
while instead over-the-top companies have witnessed a large increase in business revenues and profits. 
Over-the-top companies also benefit from operating on a worldwide scale, thanks to the ubiquitous 
nature of the world-wide-web technology.  
In Europe, telecommunications operators have traditionally much relied on service revenues – 
especially mobile operators, also thanks to the high termination rates – and less on access revenues 
and data revenues. Traditional telecommunications operators are now seriously concerned with a loss 
of revenues and overall with the asymmetries of various aspects of telecommunications regulation 
with respect to the Internet environment, which leaves over-the-top operators freer to offer their 
services.  
Telecommunications operators claim that such asymmetries place them in a disadvantaged position 
with respect to over-the-top companies, in particular regarding: privacy and data protection, e.g. data 
retention, ex-ante vs ex-post rules, rules of notice, consent; tax issues, e.g. the global dimension of 
over-the-top companies; and rules of competition and regulation, e.g. replicability obligations on 
telecommunications products, reporting obligations, open standards and interoperability obligations, 
bundle offering, and minimum quality of service. According to telecommunications operators, all 
these asymmetries play a determinant role in causing the loss of revenues that they are witnessing. As 
a consequence, the traditional operators’ profits are decreasing and slowing down their network 
investment plans. This, along with the period of financial and economic crisis, threatens the 
achievement of one of the top goals in the European Digital Agenda: investment in new networks. 
Moreover, regulatory asymmetries should be removed anyway with the intent of assuring 
technological neutrality.  
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The rising demand for services running on the web, also pushed by the applications offered by 
over-the-top operators, is triggering demand for more bandwidth and even more ubiquitous Internet 
access, a phenomenon which per se would require a renewed effort in network investment. There is 
the impression that data traffic is growing faster than the infrastructure needed to carry it and that, at 
the same time, there is a disconnection between sources of revenue and sources of costs
12
. On a 
business level, over-the-top services have certainly brought forward an issue of disruptive innovation 
in electronic communications markets. At the same time, the Internet constitutes an incredible 
opportunity for all telecommunications companies, creating a surge in demand for services, even 
though at present the transition from traditional to Internet-based services may nevertheless cause a 
loss of revenues.  
Similarly to what is happening in the US, the new business model for telecommunications 
companies may progressively shift from a services-based revenue model to a business model based 
more heavily on revenues from access and data, which would also imply a new impulse to network 
investments. However, in Europe telecommunications operators, triggered by the overwhelming 
change, maintain that, at least for the moment, the decline in voice revenues is far from offset by 
growth in broadband access and data charges (ETNO, 2013). 
For the European Union and national regulators it is essential, however, to establish a 
technologically neutral approach to the services offered by over-the-top and telecommunications 
operators. Two main points in this regard are the treatment of data and the issue of net neutrality.  
The treatment of data seems to be crucial because it constitutes an important business factor in 
general, and even more on the web (Armstrong et al., 2009). Over-the-top companies take advantage 
of the fact that the current European regulatory framework on data protection does not cover the most 
recent technological developments, whereas telecommunications companies operate under well-
defined rules for the treatment and retention of users’ data. A proposal for a regulation which will 
unify data protection within the EU and will include the new issues raised by the use of the Internet – 
e.g. social networks and cloud computing – was released at the beginning of 2012, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR). This proposal, which is being discussed, introduces, among other 
things, a general obligation for companies who want to access, use or store personal data (including 
biographical information, social information, sensitive information) to ask for consent, the right to data 
portability and the “right to be forgotten”, and concludes by adding clear rules for transfers of data 
outside of the EU. This is an important step in the direction of a pan-European regulatory framework 
for the use of data, and will equalize conditions between over-the-top players and telecommunications 
companies in Europe. However, it is essential that the new EU Data Protection Regulation strikes the 
right balance between data protection and creating economic and social opportunities, and benefits 
from technology and data.  
The issue of net neutrality is also central to the debate between telecommunications operators – the 
network providers in Europe and over-the-top companies. Net neutrality means: all traffic is treated 
equally, to the best effort; all content providers pay the same price for termination to the Internet 
Service Providers; and that the price for termination is zero. The effect of net neutrality on static and 
dynamic efficiency has been much debated in the economic literature of the last decade (Choi and 
Kim, 2010; Economides and Tåg, 2012; Cheng et al., 2011; Reggiani and Valletti, 2012). In the past, 
there have been several cases of discrimination against over-the-top services by fixed and mobile 
network providers in Europe. BEREC investigated existing practices and found that several fixed and 
mobile network operators applied restrictions, including blocking or slowing down certain services, 
affecting a significant number of subscribers in Europe (BEREC, 2012). Differentiation based on 
objective characteristics of the service could in principle be acceptable, but discriminating behaviours 
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against companies who drive up the demand for services is not only unlawful, but also a symptom of 
misaligned incentives.  
Telecommunications operators are asking policy-makers and regulators for the application of a 
non-restrictive approach to net neutrality, which would allow a differentiation of services on the basis 
of value and quality. In particular, they require the freedom to make commercial agreements involving 
end-to-end quality of service delivery between telecommunications operators, over-the-top companies, 
and content providers. They envisage this as a possible solution to the loss of revenues faced by 
telecommunication companies (ETNO, 2013).  
Lastly, telecommunications companies are asking regulators for a lighter approach to consolidation 
and horizontal cooperation within the sector, which in their view would reinforce the ability of 
European players to compete with over-the-top global operators.  
A parallel set of issues regarding the importance of so-called app portability is gaining momentum 
in the over-the-top market. Competition in the Internet markets sees two very big companies, Apple 
and Google, providing the operating system on connected devices and an extremely long list of 
application developers who offer applications on those platforms. Apple has always aimed to keep 
control over its customers by creating a “walled garden”, i.e. an environment that controls the user's 
access to web content and services, thus filtering the actual variety of content which can be reached by 
the user. Google’s system Android, instead, was set to a more open standard, with an unrestricted 
marketplace for applications. Such differences, and the possibility of using the same applications 
across different platforms will gain more and more importance in business terms, and also at a 
competitive level: in an interconnected digital market with converging technologies, the chance to 
have access to a certain platform will soon gain a significant policy dimension. 
In synthesis, the Internet is also delivering extraordinary benefits in Europe in terms of innovation 
of services and business models. Some traditional services have been heavily impacted and are 
suffering, but regulation cannot alter market dynamics by trying to preserve the past. Indeed, it can try 
to accompany the change by assuring a level playing field. The most pressing problem appears to be 
the conflict between traditional telecom operators and over-the-top global companies. At the moment, 
probably the best solution seems to be going beyond the rhetoric of the global conflict and facing each 
contentious issue on its specific merits. 
4. The search for a European Single Market and the right level of regulation 
The creation of a single internal market has always been one of the most relevant goals of the 
European Union’s intervention in electronic communications. To reach this goal, the European 
telecommunications policy first tried to achieve harmonisation of the principles and rules of operation 
of electronic communications markets in the various Member States. The Open Network Provision, as 
previously mentioned, set the basic rules for open access to the networks of the old monopolies so that 
new entrants could offer services in competition with them in all the Member States. This provision 
was the first intervention aimed at harmonising technical interfaces, access conditions, use conditions 
and tariff principles among the different Member States.  
In 2000, with the Electronic Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC) the European 
Commission pursued the definite purpose of setting up an internal market for electronic commerce 
among the Member States. The framework aimed at providing common rules regarding transparency, 
information requirements for online service providers, commercial communications, electronic 
contracts and limitations of the liability of intermediary service providers. Nonetheless, these first 
interventions towards the creation of a single internal market in Europe were fragmented, as they were 
directed at selected segments of the whole electronic communications picture.  
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The regulatory framework for electronic communications of 2002 was the first intervention with a 
truly far-reaching ambition: to take account of the growing convergence between telecommunications, 
broadcasting and information technology and push Europe toward a harmonised and unified 
framework (Directive 2002/21/EC and related, see Footnote 1). The aim of harmonisation was also 
present in the area of spectrum policy, as expressed by the Radio Spectrum Decision in 2002 
(Decision 2002/676/EC). One of its main purposes was to establish a legal framework to ensure that 
the conditions for the availability and effective use of the radio spectrum were also harmonised among 
Member States.  
Today, however, there is a common recognition that the results achieved so far toward the 
establishment of a single European market are insufficient. The real problem to be solved, however, 
seems to be the creation of a single internal market that effectively unifies national markets in terms of 
network availability and access, spectrum usage and competition rules. Without establishing the 
conditions for such a common market, a pan-European dimension of networks, both fixed and mobile, 
cannot be reached or sustained.  
As is also recognised by Commission officials, a real common telecommunications market in 
Europe would probably need a regulatory intervention less oriented towards immediate competition. 
Nevertheless, an “antitrust holiday” is deemed impossible, as any process of market consolidation in 
Europe should be monitored rigorously.  
It is important to underline that in one specific area the European Commission has decided to 
intervene directly to strike down barriers between Member State markets. We refer to international 
mobile services and mobile roaming prices. Roaming regards the provision of text messaging, voice 
calls and mobile Internet across countries. Such services used to be freely surcharged according to 
agreements between telecommunications operators belonging to different countries. Roaming prices, 
therefore, were exceedingly high and totally unconnected to industrial costs due to a lack of 
competition for roaming customers. The European Commission first intervened in 2007 (Regulation 
2007/717/EC) to broaden access and cut down roaming charges. The Regulation imposed a price cap, 
the so-called Eurotariff, both at wholesale and at retail level, and required more transparency in the 
information given to customers for voice call roaming prices. The 2007 intervention was meant to be 
exceptional and temporary, so that if normal market conditions were re-established in the market for 
roaming calls afterwards the regulation would expire in three years. The Commission, together with 
the national regulatory authorities, monitored the development of prices and the price cap was 
extended to text messaging and to data traffic in 2009 (amending act Regulation 2009/544/EC).  
More recently, however, a new Regulation was introduced (Regulation 2012/531/EC) which 
extends the price ceilings both at wholesale and at retail level, for voice, text messaging and mobile 
Internet, with the aim of bringing down the difference between national and roaming tariffs to virtually 
zero by 2015. The immediate reaction of operators is against the elimination of roaming, which they 
do not consider a necessary step to the creation of a single digital market. However, there is a strong 
will at European political level to make this change real, as abolishing persistent price differences is 
considered a crucial step to stimulating innovation and to creating a genuine single digital market.
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In the fixed network market, the path to reaching a European single market seems less 
straightforward, given the different speed of transition from copper network to fibre network in the 
various geographical areas. As we have previously mentioned, the NGA Recommendation suggests 
the introduction of geographically differentiated remedies where the introduction of a fibre alternative 
would create substantial differences in the competitive conditions in different areas. It is clear that 
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local conditions of broadband markets will matter and will have to be taken into account by telecom 
authorities to ensure a rapid and smooth switch to NGA, at least in the near future.  
All the previous questions examined regard fundamental choices of the correct regulatory 
approach. If we switch from substantial issues to the institutional instrument used to implement the 
regulatory models, it emerges that there were two main options in Europe that could have been chosen 
at the outset: operating at a central level through a formal European body or devolving regulation to 
national regulatory authorities and thus enforcing a subsidiarity principle. The option of leaving each 
Member State to create its independent regulatory framework would have contrasted with the single 
market raison d’être of the European Union and was never seriously considered. The European body 
could have been a stand-alone institution, or a pan-European organisation, a sum of the various 
national regulatory bodies. However, the institutional model chosen by the EU for the liberalisation 
and harmonisation of the telecommunications market was to direct the market change through 
instruments such as Directives, Regulations and Communications at European level, but to delegate 
implementation of these provisions to the various Member States, allowing for a certain freedom of 
choice within a predetermined framework. The model was a practical application of the principle of 
subsidiarity, which is a general principle of European law. This principle seeks to find the right 
balance of responsibility, allowing interventions to be placed at the optimal level to achieve the 
desirable market structures in the EU. 
The main aim of the subsidiarity principle applied to market regulation is to find the appropriate 
division between regulatory issues with an impact on cross-border markets, where EU-level regulators 
should have prime authority, and predominantly national issues, for which the Member States should 
have prime responsibility. This line of action works particularly well in the area of competition law, 
where infringements can actually be of a supra-national or of a national or local dimension, and so can 
be easily assigned to the authority better positioned to intervene. In telecommunications regulation, the 
principle of subsidiarity implied the creation of a general framework, and then leaving a certain room 
for action to national bodies in the implementation and adaptation of the framework to national 
circumstances. This approach was seen as the most appropriate, even though one of the main aims of 
telecommunications regulation, and more broadly electronic communications regulation, has since the 
start been the harmonisation of national markets and, eventually, the creation of a Single European 
Market. 
Somehow, this partially decentralised approach created the need to continuously balance the power 
between the Commission and the Member States, and between the Commission and national 
regulatory authorities. National Governments were also reluctant to give away full regulatory control. 
A spontaneous solution to the need for coordination and cooperation in the implementation of various 
telecommunications regulatory provisions came with the constitution of a network of regulators, the 
Independent Regulators Group (IRG), which was formed in 1998 by a group of national 
telecommunications regulatory bodies to discuss and share experiences still in the first phases of the 
liberalisation process. This national regulators network gradually became more and more involved in 
the process of regulation by the Commission, with the institution of the European Regulators Group 
(ERG) in 2002, at the time of the establishment of the New Regulatory Framework.  
The process of strengthening regulatory coordination had a decisive subsequent step with the 
establishment of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC). BEREC 
was set up with Regulation CE No. 1211/2009 with the aim of improving and unifying the 
implementation of the European regulatory framework, providing advice to the Commission and 
Member States, promoting greater harmonisation, and improving collaboration and discussion among 
national regulatory authorities, the Commission and the stakeholders.  
The institution of BEREC can be interpreted as a step towards a more centralised and cooperative 
structure of electronic communications regulation in Europe and also as an instrument to strengthen 
peer review activity that would continuously monitor the status and the functioning of regulation in the 
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single States. As also recently recognised by Vice President Kroes: “Too much intervention constrains 
flexibility, which in turn reduces the range and quality of services that can be offered to different 
consumers. Particularly as we make the transition from one technology to the other, both incumbent 
operators and others need to be able to explore new possibilities. As far as possible, we will focus on 
issues vital for healthy competition, allowing us potentially to lighten regulatory intervention 
elsewhere.” (MEMO/12/554). 
In conclusion, it seems that the intervention of European institutions in this new push for a single 
internal market may take two different directions. One way may be to intervene directly on the market, 
essentially through prices, to lower barriers and narrow differences among Member States, as has been 
done with the progressive elimination of roaming charges, to eventually reach symmetry across 
Member States and create the conditions for a cross-border telecommunications market. This kind of 
intervention is quite similar, at least in nature and purpose, if not in the use of the instruments, to what 
was experimented with the Directive on mobile termination in 2009, which was previously discussed 
in Section 2.  
A second structural route could be to adopt a lighter monitoring attitude on regulation in general 
and on mergers and consolidation among telecommunications companies of different Member States 
in particular, to let them gain size so as to be able to better compete with global players, such as the 
native internet companies. This second option could be accompanied by a new effort to abandon any 
residual localism of the national regulations, creating a complete framework for a multi-country 
regulation at European level. 
On 11 September 2013, the European Commission adopted an important legislative package called 
“Connected Continent: Building a Telecom Single Market”. This package constitutes the result of a 
major effort to lay down concrete measures to achieve the single market in ICT as early as possible. It 
contains proposals to overcome several obstacles. To solve the problems for operators wanting to 
operate cross-borders, it introduces the one-stop shop authorisation system for those operating in more 
than one Member State; it includes the “three-criteria test” in all cases where the NRAs have to choose 
in which market to intervene; and it requires full harmonisation of consumer protection rules. 
Regarding spectrum, it promotes spectrum sharing and spectrum trading; it demands common 
regulatory principles for spectrum authorisation procedures and the harmonisation of the timing and 
duration of spectrum assignments for wireless broadband across countries. It guarantees net neutrality 
across Europe. It further stresses the need to bring the roaming prices down to domestic price levels by 
2016.  
The package does not seem to radically change the existing regulatory framework for electronic 
communications in Europe, nor does it introduce heavier interventions such as a Eurotariff for 
termination rates, or a Pan-European spectrum licence, as sometimes proposed. The main aim of this 
package is to lighten the regulatory burden and eliminate unwanted market obstacles to a single digital 
market in Europe. Consolidation per se is not considered as a policy objective; rather, the creation of 
the necessary conditions for telecommunications companies to operate in a unified European market is 
considered a first step towards a new path of consolidation which will then take place as a natural 
consequence. The larger market will then make that consolidation possible under the EU competition 
law. In synthesis, the internal single market goal has not been achieved for now, but a harmonised 
model of regulation, based on the subsidiarity principle, is certainly in place and operational in 
Europe. If the single market is really the final goal of the Commission, innovation in regulation, even 
if probably insufficient, is certainly an issue for the next few years. A more direct intervention on the 
market together with the fostering of a structural consolidation, thus creating some pan-European 
players, appear to represent two instruments that the Commission can mix to force an acceleration of 
the harmonisation and consolidation process in Europe. The choice of the European Commission, as 
seen from the recent adoption of the “Connected Continent” package, is to intervene to obtain the 
harmonisation of the market conditions in Europe, so that a healthy path of consolidation will 
eventually take place. 
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5. Conclusion 
The condition of the European electronic communications markets is unavoidably influenced by the 
present economic crisis. These markets, however, have witnessed a long period of technological 
advances and service innovations, so they are among the economic sectors that have suffered least. 
Nonetheless, it is a reality that network investments are slowing down, while traditional and new 
telecommunication operators are facing both the effects of the crisis and the need to absorb disruptive 
business changes, as was discussed in the previous sections. This situation of difficulty often translates 
into a general request from telecommunications operators to equalize their operating conditions with 
those of operators coming from different platforms but offering competing services due to the process 
of technological convergence.  
In parallel, a lively debate is raging over whether new NGN fibre networks should be subject to 
similar access regulation as the legacy copper networks or whether some deregulation would be 
beneficial for investments and not too harmful for competition.  
Another major debate regards the mobile market, in particular, on the need to set more flexible 
rules for the use of the spectrum in order to minimise waste of capacity and to answer to a growing 
demand for data transmission.  
One of the most important goals for European institutions and market players in electronic 
communications is the demand for a Single European Market. The European Union, especially when 
compared to the US, appears a fragmented composition of distinct national markets, with significant 
barriers to a smooth exchange of telecommunications services between Member States. Among the 
most important barriers, one still finds: a lack of EU standards (for example on wholesale access 
products across Europe); differences in implementation of the European regulatory framework; 
differences in prices, roaming in particular until the recent interventions; and other frictions, such as a 
lack of coordination on national spectrum policies.  
In recent months, much stress has been put on the need to reach a single market for electronic 
communications, which is necessary to take advantage of the benefits offered by digital technologies 
and to be competitive at a global level. A study released by the European Commission on the cost of 
non-Europe estimated that the gain in terms of prospective growth from having a Single Digital 
Market in the European Union would be about 0.8% of GDP per year
14
. This benefit accruing in terms 
of growth would stem from more competition, the chance to gain from economies of scale for 
telecommunications operators, and the chance for European citizens to access all e-communications 
and telecommunications services throughout the EU territory.  
For telecommunications operators, too, this would be a fundamental achievement, since they 
already point to the unequal conditions they suffer with respect to over-the-top players in offering 
certain services, as explained above. In substance, one of the most important points for 
telecommunications operators is to have the chance to grow to a larger scale, to be achieved by being 
able to offer services to a much wider, at least, pan-European market.  
On several occasions, the Commission has underlined the vital importance of achieving a Single 
Digital Market, for the future of the EU as a global player and for the welfare of European citizens. 
Recently, in fact, Vice President Kroes declared that to achieve the single market the necessary steps 
are: to make communications across national borders much easier, for example through the 
establishment of a general authorisation system for telecommunications operators with supervision by 
the home Member State; to reconfirm a net neutrality standard, with more effort put into avoiding 
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unfair discrimination from network providers; and to eliminate all artificial roaming charges that do 
not reflect actual changes in costs.
15
 
The major achievements of the liberalisation of the telecommunication market in Europe are 
evident to everybody. However, technological change and global competition are now presenting the 
EU with new challenges. An innovation in the regulatory approach, maintaining the successful 
features, but modernising in various respects along the lines discussed in the previous sections, may be 
part of the response.  
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